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Abstract—In this paper, we propose how to simply
construct a pair of linear codes for the BB84 quantum key
distribution protocol. This protocol allows unconditional
security in the presence of an eavesdropper, and the pair
of linear codes is used for error correction and privacy
amplification. Since their high decoding performance im-
plies low eavesdropper’s mutual information, good design
of the two codes is required. The proposed method admits
using arbitrary low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes.
Therefore, it has low complexity and high performance for
hardware implementation. Simulation results show that the
pair of codes performs well against practical and various
noise levels.
Index Terms—Quantum cryptography, BB84 protocol,
quantum key distribution, Calderbank-Shor-Steane codes,
low-density parity-check codes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Public-key cryptosystems, based on some computa-
tional assumption, such as RSA [18] are becoming
weaker due to the progress of cryptanalysis and com-
puting power, although long-term security has been
demanded for diverse situations. In addition, if realistic
quantum computers appeared, most current public-key
cryptosystems would be broken [20].
On the other hand, a one-time pad offers information
theoretic security. Due to random outputs that bear no
statistical relationship to plaintexts, an adversary cannot
obtain information about plaintexts from ciphertexts. A
big problem with the one-time pad is that it requires
to distribute truly random keys of the same length as
plaintexts, at a rate of one per plaintext.
One solution for the key distribution problem was
suggested by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [2]. In
the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve) with unlimited
computational power, the BB84 quantum key distribution
protocol allows unconditional security under the sole
assumption that the laws of physics are correct [16], [21].
In the BB84 protocol, a pair of classical binary linear
codes, known as Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) codes
[4], is used for error correction and privacy amplification
over a classical channel when a quantum channel is
noisy. With the use of their decoding error probability,
Eve’s mutual information can be bounded.
Quantum codes, applicable as CSS codes, have been
studied previously by employing classical codes such
as Hamming, BCH, and Reed-Solomon codes [3], [10].
These classic codes have plainly constructible dual ones
for composing CSS codes, but their decoding perfor-
mance is insufficient to be decodable against practical
noise levels over the quantum channel. Consequently,
it is necessary to design and evaluate the better pair
of codes. In theoretical, after fixing one linear code,
randomly choosing the other one is recognized as a good
construction approach [23]. However, a non-random and
practical method for designing the proper pair of codes
remains an open problem.
Low-Density Parity-Check (LDPC) codes [9] are a
class of error-correcting linear block codes admitting
representations in terms of sparse bipartite graphs,
known as Tanner graphs [22], with variable nodes and
check nodes. LDPC codes provide near capacity per-
formance on memoryless channels by the sum-product
decoding algorithm. The purpose of this paper, therefore,
is to construct the good pair of codes using LDPC codes.
MacKay et al. have shown how to create the two
codes by means of dual-containing LDPC codes [15].
In the dual-containing LDPC codes, every pair of rows
in their parity-check matrices must have an even overlap,
and every row must have even weight. Because of these
properties, the parity-check matrices have many cycles
of length four in Tanner graphs. Since short cycles,
particularly length four, in Tanner graphs have a bad
influence on decoding performance by the sum-product
algorithm, the technique presented in [15] cannot apply
optimal LDPC codes. It is suitable for quantum error-
correcting codes but not for the BB84 protocol.
In this paper, we propose the simple and practical
method for constructing the pair of codes admitting
the use of arbitrary LDPC codes. For this reason, our
proposal does not need high complexity for hardware
implementation, and the pair of codes designed by the
proposed method has the same decoding performance as
chosen, namely, optimal LDPC codes.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II we
introduce the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol.
In Section III we describe efficiently encodable irregular
LDPC codes. In Section IV we propose how to construct
the two codes using LDPC codes. In Section V we
discuss the performance evaluation and show several
simulation results for the proposed method. In Section
VI we summarize the results.
II. BB84 QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION PROTOCOL
A. CSS Codes
CSS codes invented by Calderbank, Shor, and Steane
[4] are a class of quantum error-correcting codes, and
they are derived from classical linear codes by using the
concept of dual codes.
We first describe CSS codes. Let C1 and C2 be an
[n, k1] and [n, k2] classical linear code such that C1 ⊃
C2. With the use of C1 and C2, basis vectors for the CSS
code, denoted as an [n, k1−k2] quantum code, subspace
can be represented as
v −→
1√
|C2|
∑
w∈C2
|v +w〉,
where v ∈ C1. If the code C2 includes a codeword
v1 − v2, then the codewords corresponding to v1 and
v2 are the same. Thus, these codewords are equivalent
to cosets of C2 in C1. The code C1 is used for bit-flip
error correction, and the code C⊥2 is done for phase-flip
one after the application of an Hadamard transform.
B. Procedure of the BB84 Protocol
In this subsection, for simplicity, we omit the proce-
dure of the BB84 protocol over the quantum channel and
introduce that over the classical channel.
In the BB84 protocol, a sender (Alice) and a receiver
(Bob) are participants. After communicating over the
quantum channel and estimating a noise rate, Alice has
an n bit string x, and Bob has an n bit string x + e.
The procedure over the classical channel is as follows:
1) Alice chooses a random n bit codeword u ∈ C1.
2) Alice announces x+ u to Bob.
3) Bob subtracts x+u from x+e and obtains u′ by
error-correcting the result, u+ e, to the codeword
in C1.
4) Alice obtains the coset of u+C2 as keys, and Bob
obtains the coset of u′ + C2 as keys.
The code pair of C1 and C2 is CSS codes. In the
BB84 protocol, it is used for error correction and privacy
amplification. For correcting errors, it requires that the
code C1 can be decodable by some practicable decoding
algorithm. Even though Alice’s codeword u is not equal
to Bob’s codeword u′, provided that u′−u ∈ C2, Alice
and Bob can share the same keys. Thus, for sharing the
keys with high probability, the performance of the coset
C1/C2 is important rather than that of the code C1.
C. Security Evaluation of the BB84 Protocol
An entanglement purification protocol can bound
Eve’s mutual information on the shared keys [13]. If
Alice and Bob share a k-EPR-pair state with high fidelity
F , where F > 1− δ, then Eve’s mutual information can
be bounded by
IEve < −(1− δ) log2(1− δ)− δ log2
δ
22k − 1
.
This inequality shows that high fidelity implies low
entropy. By reduction from the entanglement purifi-
cation protocol to the BB84 protocol via CSS codes
[21], the parameter δ corresponds to the decoding error
probability of the worse of the two codes C1(C1/C2)
and C⊥2 (C⊥2 /C⊥1 ). Hence, high decoding performance
implies low Eve’s mutual information, and the decoding
error probability of the two codes must be small. In this
paper, we analyze the block error probability.
III. LDPC CODES
Originally invented by Gallager in the early 1960’s
[9], LDPC codes have greatly developed as one of the
most promising error-correcting codes in the last few
years. They have been recently adopted as standard error-
control coding techniques in several communication sys-
tems.
Every binary linear code of length n and dimension k
can be represented as Tanner graphs with variable nodes
vi, 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 and check nodes cj , 0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1.
The following is an example for this representation:
Example 3.1: Assume that the parity-check matrix H
of LDPC codes of length n = 6 and dimension k = 3 is
given by
H =


1 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 1

 .
The Tanner graph representing this LDPC code is shown
in Fig. 1D A cycle of length four can be seen in Fig.
1 that the set {v2, v3, c0, c1} marked by bold lines.
Short cycles in Tanner graphs degrade the decoding
performance by the sum-product algorithm.
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Fig. 1. A Tanner graph
LDPC codes are classified into regular LDPC codes
and irregular ones. The decoding performance of irreg-
ular LDPC codes is superior to that of regular ones, but
irregular LDPC codes usually need high complexity for
their encoding processes.
Irregular LDPC codes presented in [8] have algebraic
structure and an efficient encoding algorithm. Besides,
they perform well as compared to randomly constructed
irregular LDPC codes. In this paper, therefore, we choose
them as the code C1.
A. Efficiently Encodable Irregular LDPC Codes
In this subsection, we introduce how to construct
irregular LDPC codes proposed by Fujita et al. [8]. Let
p be an odd prime number such that 2 ≤ j ≤ k ≤ p− 1,
and let H be a parity-check matrix defined by an
M(:= pj)×N(:= pj+ pk) matrix [H(p) | H(d)], where
the M × M submatrix H(p) and the M × (N − M)
submatrix H(d) are defined in block form as follows:
H(p) :=


T I O · · · O O
O I I · · · O O
O O I · · · O O
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
O O O · · · I I
O O O · · · O I


,
H(d) :=


I I · · · I
P P 2 · · · P k
P 2 P 4 · · · P 2k
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
P j−1 P 2(j−1) · · · P k(j−1)


,
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C1: LDPC codes r=0.82
r=3/4
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r=0.55
Fig. 2. Decoding performance of irregular LDPC codes of length
almost 5000 and several rates on the BSC.
where I is the p×p identity matrix, O is the p×p matrix
of zeros; the p× p matrices P and T are defined by the
following matrices:
P :=


0 0 · · · 0 1
1 0 · · · 0 0
0 1 · · · 0 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 · · · 1 0


,
T :=


1 1 0 · · · 0 0
0 1 1 · · · 0 0
0 0 1 · · · 0 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 0 · · · 1 1
0 0 0 · · · 0 1


.
In addition, optimal irregular LDPC codes are con-
structed by appropriately changing several block compo-
nent of H(d) into the p× p matrix O (called a masking
method [5]).
Fig. 2 depicts the performance result of almost length
5000 and rate 0.82, 3/4, 2/3, and 0.55 by sum-product
decoding with up to 100 iterations on a binary symmetric
channel (BSC). In all cases, we employed p = 73 as
the prime number, and their LDPC codes were designed
based on masking matrices given in App. A. Despite
the negligible area of probability for error correction,
the LDPC codes of rate 3/4 and 2/3 have an error floor
starting at the block error probability of 10−4 as com-
pared to those of rate 0.82 and 0.55 due to column wight
three in their party-check matrices. However, due to little
information about the detailed methods for constructing
optimal masking matrices, we note that their elaborate
design can further improve their performance.
IV. DESIGN OF CSS CODES
In this section, we propose how to construct the pair
of codes using LDPC codes. the method is executed by
the following procedure:
1) Choose arbitrary LDPC codes defined by an M ×
N parity-check matrix H1 for the code C1.
2) Separate an M × (N −M) matrix H ′1 from H1
in ascending order of column weights, encode bits
of length N − M , where these bits are the row
vectors of H ′1, to codewords in C1, and generate
the M ×N parity-check matrix H2 by the set of
the codewords of C1.
3) Defined the code C⊥2 by H2.
The parity-check matrix H2 is composed of codewords
in C1, we have H1HT2 = O, hence the two codes satisfy
the CSS code condition C1 ⊃ C2.
This method can apply arbitrary LDPC codes and
simply construct the two codes by only choosing the
code C1. By using pseudo-random property of LDPC
codes, it pseudo-randomly creates the code C2. In short,
the proposed method is a practical approach of the
random construction presented in [23].
The parity-check matrix H2 has a low-density subma-
trix and a high-density submatrix. As for theoretical de-
coding performance, since linear codes defined by high-
density parity-check matrices have better performance
than those by low-density ones [19], it can be anticipated
that the code C⊥2 has a superior decoding property.
Suppose that the rate of C1 is r, the rate of C⊥2 is also
r, so the rate as CSS codes designed by this method is
2r − 1.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we show the simulation results for the
pair of linear codes constructed by the propose method
on the BSC. We can consider errors between Alice and
Bob as ones over the BSC. First of all, we discuss
how to evaluate the decoding performance of the code
C⊥2 (C
⊥
2 /C
⊥
1 ).
A. Decoding Performance Analysis of the Code C⊥2
The code C1 is LDPC codes; therefore, its perfor-
mance can be simply evaluated by sum-product decod-
ing. Since the code C⊥2 does not directly correct errors
in the BB84 protocol, it is sufficient to analyze the
performance by some robust and specifically evaluable
decoding algorithm.
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C1: LDPC codes
C2d/C1d: sum-product + OSD-2
C2d/C1d: bit serial sum-product + OSD-2
Fig. 3. Decoding performance of the two codes constructed by
(3,15) near regular LDPC codes of length 480 and rate 0.8; the rate
as CSS codes is 0.6.
While maximum likelihood decoding (MLD) is a
powerful algorithm, we cannot evaluate the performance
of C⊥2 (C⊥2 /C⊥1 ) due to its decoding complexity. More-
over, we cannot analyze the performance by the general
sum-product decoding algorithm as well because of a
high-density part of H2. Owing to the difficulty of the
decoding performance evaluation, both codes tend to be
constructed as mediocre LDPC codes and evaluated by
sum-product decoding [11], [14], [15].
As a robust decoding algorithm having close per-
formance to MLD, Fossorier et al. have proposed to
combine sum-product decoding with ordered statistic
decoding (OSD) [7]. In the present paper, instead of
general sum-product decoding, we applied bit serial
sum-product decoding [24], which is the basically same
algorithm as shuffled belief propagation decoding [26],
and we remove cycles of length four [12], [25] for
solving short cycles in Tanner graphs prior to decoding.
Bit serial sum-product decoding [24] is the improved
algorithm, operating the propagation of likelihood in-
formation in Tanner graphs bit-by-bit, of general sum-
product decoding, and the algorithm in [12], [25] can
remove cycles of length four by transforming Tanner
graphs under the code-equivalent condition.
In the first example, we constructed the two codes
by (3,15) near regular LDPC codes of length 480 and
rate 0.8. The rate as CSS codes is 0.6. Fig. 3 depicts
the performance result for C1 decoded by the gen-
eral sum-product algorithm, C⊥2 (C⊥2 /C⊥1 ) done by the
original combined algorithm and by the modified one.
In both cases of the original combined algorithm and
the modified one, the algorithm of the removal of the
cycles of length four is applied prior to sum-product
decoding. We chose the maximum numbers of iterations
of C1 and C⊥2 (C⊥2 /C⊥1 ) to be 100 and 256, respectively.
The parameter of the OSD algorithm is set to order-2
reprocessing. In all Figs, henceforth, we note that Cd
represents a dual code C⊥.
In comparing the original combined algorithm and the
modified one, a dramatic improvement with respect to
the decoding performance is realized by our modified
approach. The decoding performance of C⊥2 /C⊥1 by the
modified algorithm after the transformation of the Tanner
graph is superior to that of the LDPC code C1 by sum-
product decoding.
B. Approximative Decoding Approach
The modified algorithm has a disadvantage that de-
coding complexity is too high to decode LDPC codes
with block lengths of more than a few thousand bits.
Therefore, we suggest and apply an approximative eval-
uation algorithm. For explaining the algorithm, we give
one theorem:
Theorem 5.1: On a binary erasure channel (BEC),
sum-product decoding is equal to MLD after the trans-
formation of Tanner graphs (or parity-check matrices) in
response to erasure bits.
Proof: When the sum-product decoding algorithm
fails on the BEC, a set of erasures is equal to the unique
maximum stopping set [6]. The stopping set S is the
subset of the set of variable nodes in the Tanner graph,
and all neighbors in S are connected to S at least twice.
After the weights of the columns having an erasure bit
are transformed to one, namely, the number of the con-
nections is one, erasure bits can be decoded by the sum-
product algorithm. If they cannot be transformed, the
stopping set is a valid codeword. Erasure bits consisting
of S containing valid codewords cannot be decoded even
though we exploit MLD. Hence, sum-product decoding
is equal to MLD after the transformation of the Tanner
graphs in response to erasure bits.
High-density parity-check matrices have many small
stopping sets due to many cycles, but transforming their
Tanner graphs can remove small stopping sets as well as
short cycles.
1) Decoding Process: On the basis of Theorem 5.1,
we evaluate the performance of C⊥2 (C⊥2 /C⊥1 ) on the
BSC, and the detailed procedure is performed as follows:
a) Transform the number of the edges of the nodes
having an error in the Tanner graph to less than
three.
b) Remove cycles of length four in the Tanner graph.
c) Decode received words to codewords by the gen-
eral sum-product algorithm.
We anticipate some objections to this methodology, but
in our computational simulations, decoding results have
no failures when less than a few errors occur in the high-
density part of parity-check matrices. To put it more
precisely, received words are decoded to codewords in
C⊥2 /C
⊥
1 , or they cannot be estimated to any codewords.
In all cases that more than a few errors occur in the
high-density part of parity-check matrices, no codewords
can be estimated due to many cycles in Tanner graphs.
For these reasons, only errors in the low-density part of
parity-check matrices is important for the evaluation of
C⊥2 (C
⊥
2 /C
⊥
1 ), and it is reasonable to suppose that this
evaluation algorithm are near optimal on the BSC.
2) Generalized Decoding Process: If we generalize
the methodology, then the decoding process is illustrated
as follows:
a) Prepare a number of different parity-check matri-
ces, composed of a low-density submatrix and a
high-density submatrix, in the same code.
b) Remove cycles of length four in each Tanner
graph.
c) Decode received words to codewords by sum-
product algorithm using each parity-check matrix.
d) Estimate codewords by a majority decoding result.
In practical, since we cannot prepare numerous parity-
check matrices, we assume that the code C⊥2 is decoded
by this generalized decoding process and, as mentioned
in Sub-subsection V-B1, evaluate the performance by
transforming the Tanner graph in response to error bits
with one matrix.
C. Decoding Performance of Moderate-Length Codes
In this subsection, we show simulation results for
moderate-length codes. As the way for the performance
evaluation of C⊥2 (C⊥2 /C⊥1 ), we applied the above ap-
proach.
Figs. 4 and 5 depict the simulation results for the two
codes by irregular LDPC codes in [8] of length 2183
and rate 0.78; length 7832 and rate 0.55, respectively. We
employed 59 and 89 as the prime number p. Their LDPC
codes were designed based on masking matrices given
in App. B. In both cases, the decoding performance of
C⊥2 (C
⊥
2 /C
⊥
1 ) is superior to that of the LDPC code C1.
Table I summarizes the relationship between the noise
and the results covered in C⊥2 /C⊥1 in Fig. 5. We see from
Table I that the coset C⊥2 /C⊥1 covers the most codewords
that are decoding failures in C⊥2 . This is attributed to
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C1: LDPC codes
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Fig. 4. Decoding performance of the two codes constructed by
irregular LDPC codes of length almost 2000 and rate 0.78; the rate
as CSS codes is 0.56. The maximum number of iterations was set to
100 and 256, respectively.
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Fig. 5. Decoding performance of the two codes constructed by
irregular LDPC codes of length almost 8000 and rate 0.55; the rate
as CSS codes is 0.1. The maximum number of iterations was set to
200 and 512, respectively.
TABLE I
SUCCESS RATE COVERED IN C⊥2 /C⊥1 SHOWN IN FIG. 5
Noise rate on BSC (%) Success rate covered in C⊥2 /C⊥1 (%)
8.0 85.8
7.75 82.4
7.5 75.8
7.25 67.5
7.0 61.1
6.75 52.4
many small codewords in C⊥1 , and it results from small
row weights in H1 of low-rate LDPC codes.
Since the code C⊥2 (C⊥2 /C⊥1 ) has better performance
than the LDPC code C1 in every experimental result, the
proposed method can bound Eve’s mutual information on
keys by the performance of the LDPC code C1. As for
Eve’s mutual information on the generated 712 bit key
in Fig. 5, for example, they can be bounded by IEve <
0.5936 with the crossover probability 6.5% on the BSC
and IEve < 6.312 with the crossover probability 6.75%.
If we choose LDPC codes of almost length 10000 and
a little higher rate than 0.5 as the code C1, then it can
be expected that the two codes are decodable with the
crossover probability approximately 8.5% on the BSC,
keeping Eve’s mutual information small.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced the simple method for
constructing the good pair of codes using LDPC codes.
First by the combined algorithm of robust decoding
and the transformation of Tanner graphs, second by the
approximative decoding approach for moderate-length
codes, we evaluated the performance. Since the pro-
posed method admits to apply arbitrary LDPC codes,
it is less complex and better performance than existing
methods. The simulation results indicate that the two
codes constructed in this paper can be decodable against
practical noise levels on the quantum channel and bound
Eve’s mutual information on keys by the performance
of chosen LDPC codes. Therefore, this method allows
secure and effective key generations.
APPENDIX A
Masking matrices Wrate used in simulations are as
follows:
W0.82 =
2
6666666664
10000010000000001000100100001001000010001100110101101111
10100000010000010001000000100011000100100011101011110110
00000100100010000001001000100100010010001110110101011011
01000100110000010000100000110001000100100011011010101001
10010000100010010001000100010000000100010100101111010110
01010010000010001000110001000100010001000111010000111011
00000101010100100010000101001000001000001001010111010101
00100001000101001100010010010000010001100110001010101110
00001000001001100000001001000010101000010011100111101101
01000010001001000110010000001000100010000100111001111010
00011000000100000010000010000110001000010011111110010111
00101001001000100100001010000000100001000101001111111101
3
7777777775
,
W3/4 =
2
66666666666666664
000001000000100001000001000010101011010110101011011
000000000100001001010000010000110101101011010101101
100000100001000000100100000001101011010011101010110
100001000010000100000100000000101101010110011101011
000000100000100000010000100101011010110101101010110
000010000010000010000001010000101101011100101101011
010100010001000000000000100001011010110101011010110
001000001000010000010000001011010110101101010110010
000100000100000010000100001000110101101010110101101
100000100000010001000010000001101010110101101011010
000010000100000100000010000010110101011010110101101
010000010000010000100001000001011010101101011010110
000010000010001000001000001000101101011010110101101
001000001000001000100000100001010110101011010110101
000100001000000100001000000101010101101011100111010
001000010000100000001000010001010110101101011010101
010001000001000010000010000101101011010110101101001
3
77777777777777775
,
W2/3 =
2
6666666666666666666666664
0000000100000010100000000000010101001010100101
0000100001000101000000000000101001010101001010
0000000010000000100000000101010010101010010101
0100000000000010000001000010101010010101001010
0000010000100100000000000101010001101001010100
0000000100000000010000000011010100101010100101
0010000001000000001000000100101010010101001010
1000000010000000010000000001010100101010010101
0001000000100000000100001000101001010100101010
0000000000010000001000100011001010100101010100
0000000001000000000100011000010100101001010101
1001001000001000000000000000101001010100101010
0100000000010000000000000001110010100101010010
0000000000001000001000001000101010010011010001
0000100000010000000010000001000101001100101010
0000010000001000000100000000101001010101010001
0010001000000000010010000001000110100010101010
0000010000000001000001010000100101010010101001
0100000100000100000000100001001010101001010100
0010101000000000000000010000010101010010100110
0001000000100000100000100000010110001100101001
1000000000000010000001000000101011010010101010
0000000010000001000010000001010100101010010101
3
7777777777777777777777775
,
W0.55 =
2
66666666666666666666666666666666664
00000100001000000000000010000101000001
00001000000100000010100000100010000000
00000000100000000101000000001000101000
00001000000010001000000100000000010010
10000000010000000000011000010000000100
00100010000001000000000000001000001010
00100100000010000000100000100010000000
00010000000101000000000000000101001000
00000010000000001001010000000000010010
10001000010000000010000001000100000000
01000000000100000000100100010001000000
00000000101000010000000010000010000001
00100000000010001000001000000000101000
00001000000001010000000000010100010000
00010000000100000000010000101000000001
00000001100000100100000100000001000000
10000010001000000001001000000010000000
01000100010000000010000000100000000100
01000000000000100100000010010010000000
10000000100000010000100000000100100000
00000100000001001001000001000000010000
00000011010010000000000010000000100000
00010000001000010010010000001000000010
00100001000000000000001001000001001000
01000000001000000000010100000000100100
00010000010000001000001000100000010000
00100000100100100000100001000000000100
00010001000000100101000000001000000001
00001000000010010000000100010000000010
10000010000001000100000010000000000100
01000101000000100010000001000000000001
3
77777777777777777777777777777777775
.
APPENDIX B
Masking matrices Wrate used in simulations are as
follows:
W0.8 =
2
666664
00010101011000111010110110101
00100100110111111011010010110
10001010010100110111011011110
01100010011010011101101101001
10011001001111101000101011110
01001010001101010111110101101
01010001110111000111011100011
10100100101011101100101111011
3
777775
,
W0.55 =
2
66666666666666666666666666666666666666666666664
001000001000000000000000010000000000100000000010
000100000000000000000000000000100010010001000001
010010000000000001001100000000000001000000000000
100000100100000000000001000001000000000000000100
000000000010010000010000000010000000000000110000
000000010000100010100010000000010000000000000000
000000000000001100000000001000001100000010000000
000001000001000000000000100100000000001000001000
000100100000000000000001000000101001000000000000
000000000010000001000000000000010000011010000000
000010000000001000100010010000000000000000100000
000000010000010000000100001100000000000100000000
000000000001000010000000000000000110000000010100
000000000000100000010000100000000000100001000001
101000000000000100001000000001000000000000001000
010001001100000000000000000010000000000000000010
000010000000000010000000010001000010000000000010
000000000000000100001000000000000000011010000001
101100010000010001000000000000000000000000000000
000000100000000000000000000010001100000001010000
000001000010100000010000100000100000000000000000
010000000101000000000001000000010000000000100000
000000000000001000100010000100000000100000000100
000000001000000000000100001000000001000100001000
000100100000000000001000010001000100000000000000
010000000000010000000000100000000010001000000010
001001000011000000000001000100000000000000000000
000000000000001000000100000000111000000000001000
000010000000000010110000000010000000000010000000
000000001000100000000000001000000000000001100001
000000000100000001000010000000000000110100000000
100000010000000100000000000000000001000000010100
000000010001000100000000000001000001000000100000
010000101000000000000000000000100100000000001000
000010000000000010000000001000001000001010000000
001000000000000000100010000000000000100000010010
100000000100000000001001010000010000000000000000
000000000000111000000000000000000000010001000001
000100000010000000010100000000000010000100000000
000001000000000001000000100110000000000100000100
3
77777777777777777777777777777777777777777777775
.
Almost all matrices in App. A and B were designed
based on degree distribution pairs given in [1].
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